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Abstract. This studyfocuses on the agency costsexplanation of long run performance of debt issuers based 
on debt issuance data in Malaysia during January 2001 to October 2009. Long run performance is measured 
by buy and hold abnormal return (BHAR) while growth opportunity (GO), ownership concentration (OC) 
and free cash flow (FCF) are adopted as the proxy for agency costs. Using linear regression method, the 
study finds that BHAR is positively influenced by GO and OC and negatively influenced by FCF which 
support the agency cost explanation of capital structure. Increase inthe performance of debt issuersis found to 
be associated with the monitoring role of debt. Debt issuers with more concentrated ownership are found to 
be benefitted from the issuancethrough the reduction of agency costs. 
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1. Introduction 
One of the explanations for the wealth effect of capital structure change under imperfect capital market is 
the agency cost arguments. Jensen and Meckling [1] propose the agency theory which argues that the 
ownership of the firm remains equally concentrated if the firm chooses debt over equity, which helps the 
firm to avoid higher agency cost of dispersed ownership under the equity financing alternative. Hence, in a 
highly concentrated ownership context, increase of debt in the capital structure should result in decreasing 
agency costs of equity and/or increasing agency costs of debt due to the actions of inside agents. Since debt 
covenants already mitigate the agency cost of debt, increase of debt would likely results in increase in firm 
value.Jensen [2] then advances the free cash flow hypothesis, which claims that debt issuance results in 
obligatory payment of interest and principal, which reduces the free cash flow available for the managers to 
serve their own interest.  
Moreover, level of debt and degree of monitoring is evidenced to have impact on the agency costs [3]. In 
addition, Leuz et al. [4] find that the managers and controlling shareholders enjoy private control benefits in 
an environment of concentrated ownership, and less developed market with weaker investor protection. 
According to Campello[5], a large literature supports that capital structure changes have link with the actions 
of both the inside agents and the outside parties.  
Straight debt issues are often associated with capital structure changes. Prior capital structure studies 
mainly focused on the determinants of capital structure [6] itself, keeping practically more useful question 
about determinants of value effects of capital structure changes through debt issuances scant and 
inconclusive [7; 8]. Theoretically, post-announcement price should reflect or capture future implications of a 
decision, however, this is only true in markets that are efficient, or at least semi-strong efficient. Kim and 
Shamsuddin [9] shows that many emerging markets such as Korea and Taiwan are weak form efficient while 
some other markets including Malaysia are inefficient  despite continuing financial liberalization in these 
countries. Thus, the wealth effect of long-term debt issuance decision in these markets may be reflected in 
the long run performances, instead of short run stock price effect. 
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Rare, if any, attempts has been taken to explain the long run value effect of debt issuers in terms of 
agency theory, especially in emerging countries. This study thus focuses on filling this knowledge gap. The 
study is conducted in Malaysia since Malaysia has an active bond market where her percentage of debt issues 
per GDP is the highest among the emerging countries [10]. 
2. Past Related Studies 
Much research on long run stock return performance following a particular financing activity focuses 
more on equity financing, with most of them studied performance of IPOs [e.g., 11; 12], some studied 
seasoned equity issues [e.g., 13; 14], and a few studied preferred equity issues [e.g., 15].  
Some studies have examined the long run performance of straight and convertible bond issuances only in 
the US context since the 1990s. Jewell and Livingston [16] studied three year long run stock returns of debt 
issuers during 1980-90. They found strong impact of bond rating.  
Using a sample of convertible bond issuers of USA during 1975–90, Lee and Loughran [17] found 
significant poor stock and operating performance in the years following the offering, which they explain as a 
result of high free cash flow problem combined with lack of enough investment opportunity.  They have 
used nonparametric simulation test for examining the influence of recent equity issuance and size of the issue 
but could not completely explain the underperformance by these factors. 
For both the straight and convertible debt issuers in USA during 1975-89, Spiess and Affleck-Graves [18] 
documented substantial long-run post-issue underperformance. Using nonparametric comparisons, they 
found that the underperformance is more severe for smaller, younger, and for firms issuing speculative grade 
debt. Based on these results they argue that like equity offerings, debt offering also signal the market that the 
firm is overvalued. As a result, initial under-reaction of the psychologically biased investors is followed by 
similar full impact over the long run.   
Dichev and Piotroski [19] found no abnormal returns for the straight debt issuers and a high degree of 
underperformance for the convertible bond issuers in the five years following the debt issuance. Using 
nonparametric bootstrapping method, they also find higher degree of underperformance for larger 
convertible debt issues. They argue that the news of issuing convertible debt rather than straight debt is a bad 
news according to the pecking order theory.  
In response to weaknesses of previous studies such as biased inference of standard parametric test, Datta, 
Iskandar-Datta, and Raman [20] used a more comprehensive 24-year sample in USA. They found substantial 
long run underperformance which is attributed to market timing of the issuance as well as significant 
reduction of growth opportunities following the issuance. They have also conducted a multivariate regression 
of long run abnormal return against firm size, maturity of the debt issue, degree of bank monitoring, issuer’s 
growth opportunity, degree of information asymmetry associated with the issuer, pre-issue stock return, 
exchange-listing, and bond rating. They found significant negative influence of debt maturity and exchange 
listing, and significant positive influence from the degree of bank monitoring, the interaction of investment 
opportunity and bank monitoring, the age, pre-issue stock return, and bond rating. 
Chou, Wang, Chen, and Tsai [21] also find stock return underperformance of convertible bond issuers 
involved in earning management during the five year post issue period. This study used US sample during 
the period 1981-1998. They find that the temporary overvaluation of the stock is corrected in the long run 
when investors correct their valuation error.  
Taken as a whole, although the empirical evidences could show overall agreement for the long run 
underperformance of convertible bonds, it was not possible to reach into conclusion about the long-run 
performance of straight debt issues and the underlying reasons. Moreover, the underlying reasons considered 
in these studies do not extensively cover the variables related to agency environment of the firm despite the 
theoretical support for it. 
3. Theoretical Framework 
One, two, and three year buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR) are used as the dependent variable in 
this study based on the previous literature. The explanatory variables comprises of agency costs proxies, but 
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given that the agency cost effect theoretically takes place in the context of capital structure change, and all 
debt issuances do not result in equivalent capital structure changes, the hypothesised relationships between 
these variables and long run performance are moderated by capital structure changes. 
3.1. Growth opportunity 
According to Myers [22], growth opportunity can be considered as the ‘real option’, value of which 
depends on the firm’s discretionary future investments. He also argues that firms with real option that issue 
risky debts would experience decrease in value due to increase in agency cost of debt. His argument is later 
supported by Titman and Wessels [23] who argue that flexibility of future investments makes the growing 
industry firms to expropriate wealth from the bond holders to the equity holders who ultimately control the 
firm. On the other hand, Jensen[2]associates high growth firms with high free cash flow but suggests that the 
source of value in more debt financing by disciplining the management from discretionary use of free cash 
flow is not much applicable for high growth firms because they use up the free cash flow for exploiting the 
growth opportunities even without debt.  
Recently, Frank and Goyal [24] empirically prove growth opportunity to be one of the six ‘core factors’ 
determining leverage. They argue that growth reduces free cash flow problem, but intensifies agency 
problems related to debt. Based on the above theoretical and empirical findings, debt issuers with higher 
growth opportunity are expected to experience lower performance in the long run.  
3.2. Managerial ownership 
Based on Jensen and Meckling [1], arguably the agency problem of equity is less severe when managers 
hold a large fraction of the outstanding shares in the company. If managers hold a small fraction, they work 
less vigorously or consume excessive perquisites because they bear a relatively small portion of the resulting 
costs. Issuance of debt can reduce the free cash flow for discretionary use by them and thereby reduce the 
agency cost of equity to a large extent. 
Douglas [25] argues that more debt can mitigate the possibility that manager will expropriate wealth 
from shareholders by making investments with highly volatile outcome and higher information asymmetry. 
This benefit of debt issuance is possible only to the firms with low managerial ownership. As the level of 
managerial ownership increases, the degree of this benefit reduces.  
3.3. Ownership concentration 
Concentrated ownership can increase the conflict of interest between minority shareholders and inside 
large shareholders [26; 27]. The large shareholders who enjoy the control of firm may force the management 
for unrelated and non-value-maximizing investments for their private benefits [28]. This type of agency cost 
can be mitigated by issuing more debt. Thus, the benefit of debt issuance in the form of reducing agency cost 
is more for firms with highly concentrated ownership.  
3.4. Free cash flow 
Issuance of more debt creates fixed financial obligations which can limit manager’s scope for 
discretionary use of free cash flow [2; 29]. The recent study of Gangopadhyay and Yook [30]provides recent 
support for this argument by showing that the stock repurchase, which also increase leverage ratio of the firm, 
result in superior abnormal performance if the firm has high amount of free cash flow.  
4. Data and Methods 
Initial list of all the bond issuances during January 2001 to October 2009 period are extracted from the 
Securities Commission Malaysia website. The initial list of bond issues comprises a total of 720 in one year 
performance sample, 675 in two year performance sample, and 591 in three year performance sample. After 
exclusions due to convertible issues, non-listed companies, banks and financial institutions, absence of Bursa 
Malaysia announcement, multiple issues, same-day-issues, and data unavailability, the size of one, two and 
three year samples become 165, 145, and 126, respectively. 
Non-event firms that are very similar to the event firms in the sample based on size and book-to-market 
are used as benchmark firms. The Euclidean distances is estimated between each of the issuers in the sample 
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and the benchmark candidates based on the size measured by market capitalization of the firm, and market-
to-book ratio. For the estimation of the BHAR, the average return of the two closest available matching firms 
is considered as benchmark return. 
The first step of calculating BHAR is to calculate the holding period return of firm i for the analysis 
period in months, T, BHR T ∏ 1 r 1T , where, r  is the monthly raw return of firm i in month t. 
Using the same calculation the holding period return for the benchmark b is, BHR T ∏ 1 r 1T . 
The buy-and-hold abnormal return for each firm i in month t after benchmark adjustment is the difference 
between the buy-and-hold returns of the firm and the benchmark, BHAR BHR BHR , which is used 
for calculating the mean buy-and-hold abnormal return for month t as follows, BHAR ∑ ω BHAR , 
where,  is the number of securities in the portfolio for month , and 1⁄ . 
Ordinary least square regression is used to test the relationships in the proposed theoretical framework. 
Following regression is tested for one, two, and three year analysis periods in this study: 
 
where,  variable related to agency cost, comprises of Growth Opportunity (GO) measured by 
(Total Assets – Equity Capital + Market Capitalisation) / Total Assets, Managerial Ownership (MO) 
measured by the percentage of total outstanding shares held by the executive or managing directors of the 
debt issuing firm during the last year before the issue, Ownership Concentration (OC) measured by 
Herfindahl Index which is calculated as the sum of the squared percentage of shares held by the five largest 
shareholders, and Free Cash Flow (FCF) measured by (operating income – current tax + change in deferred 
tax – interest expense – preferred dividend – ordinary dividend)/net tangible asset;  = capital structure 
change measured by the difference between the year-end debt ratio before and after the issue; and  = error 
term. 
Three models are tested for each of the one, two, and three year analysis periods. Model 2 is formed by 
adding the interaction terms with Model 1. Model 3 is the restricted models derived from stepwise omission 
of insignificant variables from Model 2.For the purpose of comparing the three models, the joint significance 
of added interaction variables as well as omitted variables are tested based on the F-statistics. In addition, the 
adjusted R2, Akaike’s Information Criteria (AIC), and the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) are 
used to decide the best model.  
5. Findings 
Panel A, B, and C in Table 1 are used to report the regression results of one, two, and three year BHAR, 
respectively. In all cases, Model 3 is selected as the best model based on the model selection criterions. All 
the models are tested for heteroscedasticity by White test and multicollinearity by variance inflation factor. 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard error has been used to correct the problem.  
Table 1: Regression results. 
Model 1 2 3 
Panel A: Determinants of one year performance 
  Coeff. t-ratio  Coeff. t-ratio  Coeff. t-ratio  
const 0.0536 1.13 0.0676 1.52 0.0601 1.35 
CSCH 0.2353 0.6 0.5791 1.58
GO 0.0845 0.96 0.1175 2.36 ** 0.0991 2.04 ** 
MO 0.1343 0.71 0.1476 0.78
OC 0.38 0.77 0.7573 2.21 ** 0.5818 1.75 * 
FCF -0.2403 -0.51 -1.1473 -1.87 * 
CSCH*GO -0.8861 -2.78 *** -0.6721 -2.22 ** 
CSCH*MO -0.7644 -0.46
CSCH*OC 8.9394 2.87 *** 7.5493 2.47 ** 
CSCH*FCF       2.4553 1.6         
F   0.72     2.42**     3.91***   
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Model 1 2 3 
Adj. R2 0.003 0.072 0.066 
AIC 299.8 291.7 288 
BIC   318.4     322.7     303.5   
Panel B: Determinants of two year performance 
  Coeff. t-ratio  Coeff. t-ratio  Coeff. t-ratio  
const 0.0103 0.15 0.0153 0.22 0.0103 0.15 
CSCH 0.6782 1.27 0.8693 1.51
GO 0.0756 1.09 0.0807 1.05
MO -0.0113 -0.04 -0.0193 -0.07
OC 1.0494 1.87 * 1.2158 2.09 ** 1.0699 1.92 * 




CSCH*FCF       0.3241 0.14         
F   1.36     1     3.69*   
Adj. R2 0.012 0 0.018 
AIC 359.3 364.9 354.5 
BIC   377.2     394.6     360.5   
Panel C: Determinants of three year performance 
  Coeff. t-ratio  Coeff. t-ratio  Coeff. t-ratio  
const -0.0804 -0.82 -0.0943 -0.96 -0.0963 -1 
CSCH 0.8833 1.11 1.0935 1.32
GO 0.1088 1.14 0.0685 0.63
MO -0.5062 -1.24 -0.3435 -0.81
OC 1.5244 1.83 * 1.4632 1.74 * 1.4639 1.8 * 
FCF 0.6211 0.39 0.1725 0.1
CSCH*GO    -0.183 -0.27  
CSCH*MO 1.62 0.4
CSCH*OC 0.5001 0.06
CSCH*FCF       -34.9274 -2.15 ** -36.1127 -2.68 *** 
F   1.66     1.59     5.59***   
Adj. R2 0.026 0.041 0.068 
AIC 389 390.7 380.4 
BIC   406     419.1     388.9   
*, **, and *** indicate 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively. Underlined t-ratio is based on 
heteroscedasticity robust standard error. 
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As the results indicate, GO is found to affect only one year performance whereas OC is found to affect 
the long run performance over one, two, and three year period. In addition, the interaction variables, 
CSCH*OC, and CSCH*GO are shown to have effect on long run performance over the one year period only. 
The effect of CSCH*FCF is found only for three year performance. 
6. Conclusion 
Debt issuers with high growth opportunity are found to create more wealth in one year period, which is 
contradictory with the expected relationship. Nevertheless, the opposite relationship is observed when the 
interaction between capital structure change and growth opportunity is considered. The one year results of 
this study, in fact, strongly support that the negative impact of growth opportunity becomes important only 
when there is increase in the financial leverage. If the capital structure change is zero, growth opportunity 
rather positively influence the performance because the firm can utilize the growth opportunities without any 
adverse effects associated with financial distress costs and/or agency costs. 
The results of ownership concentration of this study support the argument that if the ownership is 
concentrated to a few large shareholders, issue of debt will improve long run performance by controlling the 
free cash flow from non-value-maximizing investments for private benefits. 
Debt issuing firms with higher free cash flow and increased leverage experience low performance in 
three years. However, this relationship is not evident for one or two year analysis periods. Therefore, this 
study suggests that Malaysia debt issuances do not induce performance by means of limiting management’s 
discretionary use of free cash flow. Arguably, the benefit of higher financial leverage at the presence of high 
free cash flows should be observable if no substitute measures of reducing the agency costs are undertaken. 
However, Zhang [31] provides evidence that debt and executive stock options (ESOS) are substitutes in 
attenuating the free cash flow problem of a firm.This study thus provides indication that the free cash flow 
hypothesis may not be applicable at the presence of alternative controlling schemes for agency conflicts. 
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